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CHAPTER 1 (UNCLASSIFIED)
INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose

This manual establishes doctrines and procedures
for Chemical Corps intelligence activities and sets
forth the responsibilities of the Chemical Corps in
production of technical intelligence. These doctrines are based on those contained in FM 30-16.

2. Scope

a. Chemical Corps organization, functions, operations, and responsibilities for the collection, production, and dissemination of CBR intelligence
are described in sufficient detail to give an understanding of the chemical intelligence contribution
to the total military intelligence effort.
b. Recommendations for corrections and changes
should be forwarded to the Chief of Chemical Officer,
Building T-7, Gravelly Point, Washington 25, D. C.
3. Definitions
a. CBR Intelligence.
CBR intelligence refers
collectively to chemical warfare (CW), biological
warfare (BW), and radiological warfare (RW),
intelligence. The term includes foreign scientific,
political, social, industrial, geographic, and economic
factors which affect or influence CBR intelligence.
4
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b. CBR Warfare. This term has three aspects for
definition:
(1) Chemical warfare (CW) involves the tactics
and techniques of conducting warfare by
the use of toxic chemicals and smoke or
incendiary agents to inflict casualties or a
desired disadvantage upon the enemy.
(2) Biological warfare (BW) is the military
use of Ii ving organisms or their toxic
products to cause death, disability, or
damage to man, his domestic animals,
or crops.
(3) Radiological warfare (RW) involves the
tactics and techniques of conducting warfare by using radioactive materials or
methods which will result in the production
of casualties by radiation.
c. Intelligence Targets. Enemy and/or foreign
personnel, document centers, CBR installations,
facilities, or depots which are suitable targets for
exploitation by intelligence task force operations
under G2 direction (FM 30-16).

CONFIDENTIAL
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CHAPTER 2 (UNCLASSIFIED)
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Section I. GENERAL
4. Principles
a. CBR intelligence is an integral part of the total
military intelligence effort and is essential in military
operations. CBR intelligence factors may often be
the principal elements determining the feasibility of
execution of proposed military operations.
b. CBR intelligence relates directly to Chemical
Corps functions at all levels. It is essential to the
formulation and implementation of Chemical Corps
plans as well as Army tactical plans and operations in
a theater of operations.
c. CBR intelligence about a particular theater of
operations may concern other theaters and should be
made available promptly to them and to the Department of the Army (FM 30-16).
d. CBR intelligence in a theater of operations will
be collected from all available sources (Fl\'1 30-16).
e. All Chemical Corps personnel must be alert for
opportunities to collect and forward information of
value to the Chemical Corps and to all intelligence
organizations.
f. Chemical Corps field personnel are responsible
for protecting captured enemy CBR materiel until its
6
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usefulness and intelligence value can be fully determined by qualified personnel.

5. Role of Chemical Corps Intelligence

a. CBR intelligence of a scope commensurate
with each level of command is required by the commander to properly arrive at a strategic or tactical
command decision or to formulate either an operational or strategic plan. It is one of the essential
elements without which no intelligence picture is
complete. The possibility and/or probability of the
use of CBR weapons by an enemy, his level of CBR
training, the effectiveness of his offensive and defensive CBR equipment, and the enemy's potential
for developing and waging CBR warfare are important considerations at every level of military
planning.
b. The Department of the Army levies upon the
Chief Chemical Officer specific intelligence responsibilities for worldwide collection of CBR information
and materials of military significance from all sources.
The Chief Chemical Officer, in turn, has established
the U.S. Army Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency
(COIA) to direct the CBR collection effort and to
evaluate, produce, maintain, and disseminate intelligence studies on CBR doctrine, organization, research and development, tactics, economic and
scientific resources, and logistical support of the
chemical services of foreign armed forces. In addition, the COIA discharges the ·other intelligence
responsibilities (except counterintelligence) of the
Chief Chemical Officer, to the intelligence com-
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rnunity. CBR intelligence contributions are integrated with all other military intelligence at Department of the Army level to produce the essential
strategic intelligence upon which doctrinal, strategic,
and logistical planning are based by the appropriate
agencies within the Department of Defense.
c. In a theater of operations, other arms and
services depend upon the Chemical Corps for CBR
intelligence which may affect their planning and
operations; conversely, the Theater Army Chemical
Officer must depend upon other theater staffs and
agencies for military and technical intelligence which
may affect CBR planning and operations. Proper
liaison must be maintained between staff chemical
officers and other staffs and agencies at all echelons
for rapid exchange of technical information and
intelligence matter. Due to its peculiar significance
often communications zone and army group commanders are particularly concerned with CBR
intelligence to a considerably greater degree than
with general combat intelligence.

Section II. TYPES OF CHEMICAL CORPS
INTELLIGENCE
6. General
Chemical Corps intelligence is one of the technical
aspects of military intelligence; it contributes both
tactical and technical components to combat intelligence and encompasses certain obvious strategic and
counterintelligence functions.
8
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7. Strategic Intelligence
Strategic intelligence is produced in peace and in
war, usually by theater and higher headquarters or
by agencies under their control. It is used chiefly
by senior military commanders and their staffs in
the development of operational plans. In its three
main forms, basic studies, current intelhgence, and
staff intelligence, strategic intelligence deals with
established conditions, recent events, and future
probabilities in foreign areas.
a. Basic Studies. Chemical Corps intelligence
contributes to basic surveys of strategic intelligence,
delineating the known (or estimated) organization,
personnel, doctrine, training, weapons, CBR capabilities, materiel production, and stockpiles of foreign
armed forces. It also encompasses civilian scientific personnel, equipment, training, and plans and
organization for defense against CBR attack. It
collects and analyzes data on industrial research and
development, and laboratory equipment, facilities,
and production. Such surveys and studies may be
combined with economic, political, sociological, and
other military studies to serve Government and military needs in the development of policies and plans,
and in operations.
b. Current Intelligence. Chemical Corps intelligence contributes analyses and evaluations of the
CBR aspects of recent trends and current developments in a foreign area. It estimates their probable
effect upon governmental and military policymaking, planning, supply, and operations.
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c. Staff Intelligence. Chemical Corps intelligence
contributes to estimates of future possibilities or
probabilities, analyses, and evaluations of specific
CBR data to determine their significance as indications that the foreign area in"olved is preparing for
operations inimical or disadvantageous to the United
States (FM 30-5).
8. Combat Intelligence
Combat intelligence is produced primarily in the
field in time of war and is used principally by tactical commanders and their staffs. It is concerned
with a relatively local situation: the enemy forces
and equipment opposing a combat unit, and the
weather and terrain which affect the unit.
a. Tactical Intelligence. CBR aspects of tactical
intelligence are invaluable for tactical planning.
This intelligence must be disseminated promptly to
appropriate headquarters to insure that it will be of
maximum value to those concerned with strategic as
well as tactical intelligence matters. In many cases,
combat intelligence studies will be similar in form to
the basic studies of strategic intelligence.
b. Technical Intelligence. CBR aspects of technical intelligence in a theater of operations deal with
evaluation of evidence indicating enemy use, potential, or intentions concerning the use of CBR weapons, exploitation of captured enemy materiel and
documents, and technical information about the
enemy.
10
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9. Relation Between Strategic and Combat Intelligence
Both strategic and combat intelJigence are concerned with information of military significance
about foreign powers and with actual or possible
areas of operations. Certain CBR intelligence of
value in tactical operations will be found in basic
studies of conditions in foreign areas. On the other
hand, strategic intelligence may be developed from
information obtained through CBR combat
intelligence.

10. Counterintelligence
General counterintelligence measures are
scribed in FM 30-5.
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CHAPTER 3 (CONFIDENTIAL)
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
Section I. (UNCLASSIFIED) GENERAL
11. Chief Chemical Officer

The Chief Chemical Officer is responsible for the
collection and production of CBR intelligence on
foreign materiel, facilities, installations, processes,
procedures, potential, etc., for use throughout the
Chemical Corps and dissemination through ACSI/
DA or G2 at appropriate levels of command to other
services and agencies as is indicated by the nature of
the finished intelligence. The Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency is designated to discharge this
responsibility for the Chief Chemical Officer.
12. Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency

a. General. The Chemical Corps Intelligence
Agency (COIA) is a Class II installation of the
Chemical Corps established to produce finished intelligence studies on CBR doctrine, organizations,
research and development, tactics, economic resources, and logistical support of the chemical services
of foreign armed forces.
b. Mission. The COIA is charged with accomplishing, by using Chemical Corps resources and all
other available intelligence sources, the collection,
final evaluation, production, maintenance, and dis12
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semination of chemical, biological, and radiological
(CBR) intelligence for the Chemical Corps, the Department of the Army, and other members of the
intelligence community.
c. The Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency(1) Produces basic intelligence studies and estimates for Chemical Corps organizational
elements and contributes to the total national intelligence surveys.
(2) Coordinates CBR intelligence levies of other
agencies upon Chemical Corps organizational elements.
(3) Exercises staff supervision over the preassignment training of Chemical Corps
organizational elements.
(4) Fills requirements for Chemical Detachment
(Technical Intelligence) (CD (TI)) and
other trained CBR intelligence personnel
for oversea or specialized intelligence service
as levies upon the Chemical Corps are received.
(5) Coordinates with other members of the intelligence community the efforts of certain
CBR intelligence specialists and specialized
detachments.
(6) Exercises staff supervision over the operations of certain TOE organizations, e. g.,
CD(TI)'s engaged in intelligence operations.
13. Staff Chemical Officers

a. General. Intelligence personnel are not normally provided in the chemical sections at all eche-
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Ions of command; therefore, the chemical officer is
responsible for all Chemical Corps intelligence activities pertinent to his level of command. At such
higher levels of command as theater, communications
zone, joint logistical, field army, or independent corps,
a CBR intelligence subsection may be organized
within the chemical section.
b. Responsibilities. The chemical officer at each
level of command is responsible for(1) The collection, preliminary evaluation, initial interpretation, and forwarding of all
known data on enemy targets, personnel,
CBR research and development activities,
and enemy CBR materiel obtained from
lower, adjacent, and higher headquarters
or Department of the Army documents,
publications, and reference works to the
organization that can use the information.
(2) Informing the G2 of the identity, description
and location of any CBR installation, facility or depot which is considered an appropriate tactical target.
(3) Maintaining files or target folders containing complete details on enemy targets to be
exploited, special personnel to be located
and interrogated, special items of enemy
CBR materiel to be collected and studied,
and on enemy CBR technical procedures to
be investigated and evaluated.
(4) Informing appropriate personnel and for
briefing members of attached or assigned
14
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CD (TI) 's on specific m1ss10ns to be
accomplished.
(5) Establishing liaison with all chemical or
other depots within his area to insure
adequate intelligence coverage of all captured CBR materiel.
(6) Knowing procedures (FM 30-16) and maintaining close contact with G2 and the
technical intelligence coordinator to learn
of the availability and location of targets
and personnel to be investigated, and to
secure access to captured documents of
interest to the Chemical Corps.
(7) The field examination and preliminary
evaluation of all CBR materiel considered
of primary intelligence interest (app. II).
(8) The collection of all CBR information derived from captured documents, from interrogation of selected enemy and friendly
military and civilian personnel, and from
investigation of CBR intelligence targets.
c. Liaison. The chemical officer or his representative is responsible for effecting the liaison necessary
to insure proper accomplishment of the Chemical
Corps intelligence mission and maximum effective
coverage in the CBR intelligence field. Liaison with
G2, particularly with the G2 technical intelligence
coordinator, and with intelligence agencies of the
other technical services at various echelons is essential. Liaison with intelligence sections of the Air
Force and the Navy should be established through
appropriate channels and utilized whenever feasible.
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14. Chemical Detachments (Technical Intelligence)
a. General. Chemical Detachments (Technical
Intelligence) are allocated to a theater of operations
as required. Subsequently, they may be attached
to any of the theater subordinate commands to meet
the needs of the Chemical Corps intelligence mission.
Normally these CD(Tl)'s a.re not required at command levels lower than field army, but may be
provided at lower echelons by the army commander
if required.
b. Duties. Chemical Detachments (Technical Intelligence) assist the staff chemical officer in his
responsibility to provide the commander, through
the G2, with CBR intelligence by preparing intelligence reports, and by performing the duties outlined
below.
(I) Collect items of enemy CBR materiel which
may be of special interest or have intelligence value.
(2) Make preliminary evaluations of the components, use, and effectiveness of collected
enemy CBR materiel (app. II).
(3) Assist chemical depot and supply agency
personnel in instructing other Chemical
Corps personnel and troop units in the use,
handling, and maintenance of reissued
enemy CBR equipment.
(4) Expedite the flow of all captured enemy
CBR materiel of intelligence interest to
the appropriate agency.
(5) Locate and evaluate CBR intelligence
targets of all types, including those pre16
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viously designated and those located by the
detachment and report them to the appropriate agency.
(6) Assist in the interrogation of prisoners of
war (par. 24e(l)).
(7) Collect and evaluate CBR information obtained from captured documents and publications.
(8) Perform special operations as may be
required.
15. Technical Specialists
a. A primary source of technical specialists for
consultation or special assignment utilization is the
Theater Chemical Laboratory Company (TOE
3-97R). This laboratory company comprises chemical, analytical, engineering and toxicology sections,
and conducts examinations, evaluations and identification of materiels related to CBR warfare. Although primarily trained to handle matters pertaining to CBR warfare in the field, utilizing only its
TOE equipment, this laboratory is usually established
at a central location where permanent industrial or
university facilities may be utilized, thereby enabling
it to handle almost any chemical problem arising
from military operations in the field.
b. Should a mobile chemical laboratory (TOE
3-500R) be stationed nearby when technical assistance is required, a capability in personnel and equipment worthy of investigation may be presumed
despite its limitations when compared with the
theater base laboratory mentioned above.
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c. Primary responsibility for identification of
enemy BW agents has been levied upon the medical
service, thus assuring the presence of technically
qualified personnel to augment the bacteriologists or
biochemists on the staff of the CD (TI) 's.
d. Chemical materiel and supply specialists are
available at depots and other Chemical Corps installations within the theater.
e. Personnel in any of the categories mentioned
may serve as consultants in their own fields, or may
be assigned temporarily to CD(TI)'s or other intelligence units to investigate special problems in the
CBR intelligence field.
16. Combat Units

Chemical Corps intelligence personnel are not
normally provided at headquarters lower than field
army (or independently operating corps), but Chemical Corps personnel of all units are expected to be
alert for and to investigate CBR incidents and to
render reports on information and materiel of special
CBR intelligence value. Division and army group
chemical staff officers are concerned with the collection, safeguarding, reporting and initial examination
of captured foreign materiel, facilities, and installations, and with the immediate evacuation of captured
foreign materiel of CBR intelligence interest. Under
special conditions Chemical Detachments (Technical
Intelligence) or Chemical Corps intelligence officers
may be assigned by the army commanders to facilitate or expedite the exploitation of productive CBR
intelligence areas. Commanders of other than
18
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Chemical Corps units are also responsible for reporting CBR intelligence matters (app. III).
Section II. (CONFIDENTIAL) ECHELONS
17. (CONFIDENTIAL) Theater Army Chemical
Officer
The theater army chemical officer is responsible
for planning for and operation of the theater chemical service. His intelligence responsibilities include:
a. (UNCLASSIFIED) Staff supervision of all
CBR intelligence activities at theater level to insure
maximum exploitation of all available sources of
information and materiel having CBR intelligence
value.
b. (UNCLASSIFIED) The forwarding of CBR
intelligence to the Department of the Army and
dissemination through appropriate channels to all
theater agencies concerned.
c. (UNCLASSIFIED) The establishment of liaison with other governmental intelligence agencies
operating within the theater and with such other
groups as may be desirable.
d. (UNCLASSIFIED) Recommending the allocation of Chemical Detachments (Technical Intelligence) to lower commands.
e. (CONFIDENTIAL) Directing the chemical
servfce effort within the theater as pertains to the
collection, classification, storage, and reissue (if
desirable) of all captured CBR equipment and materiel by appropriate sections of chemical and other
depots within the theater. Intelligence responsibilities concerning captured CBR items include-
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(1) (UNCLASSIFIED) Based upon Chemical

Corps responsibility for issue-the preparation of complete preliminary instructions
on the operation and maintenance within
the theater of such items and for the
full utilization of such materiel captured
in large quantities.
(2) (CONFIDENTIAL) Based on Chemical
Corps responsibility f.or design(a) (CONFIDENTIAL) The processing of
such Items "for nameplate and factory
marking data and rubbings.
(b) (UNCLASSIFIED) The preliminary analysis and description of the characteristics
of such items.
(c) (UN CLASSIFIED) The forwarding of
selected samples of such items to the
Department of the Army for final
analysis.
(d) (UNCLASSIFIED) The transmission of
reports pertaining to (b) and (c) above
to the Department of the Army or to
such installation as he may designate.
(e) (UNCLASSIFIED) The transmission, at
theater army level, of captured CBR
items and related information collected
within the theater for which the Chemical
Corps has issue responsibility, to the
theater technical service having design
responsibility for the items.
20
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18. (UNCLASSIFIED)
Officer

Army

Group

Chemical

a. Since the army group is primarily tactical,
the chemical officer will be chiefly concerned with
those intelligence activities which may influence
the tactical operations of the field armies. Under
certain conditions CD(TI)'s may be allocated to an
army group.
b. The intelligence duties and responsibilities of
the army group chemical officer, under the general
staff coordination of G2, will include(1) The staff supervision of all CBR intelligence
activities under the jurisdiction of the
army group.
(2) Operational control of CD(Tl)'s assigned
or attached to the army group. 'I'his will
not be construed to limit the prerogative
of the field commander in prescribing the
degree of control to be exercised by a special
staff officer.
(3) Cooperation with other technical services
and intelligence agencies to obtain samples
of captured materiel of interest to the
Chemical Corps.
(4) Distribution of completed reports on the
processing of captured materiel of interest to the Department of the Army and
dissemination of the information and intelligence developed therefrom to the army
group G2 and the chemical officer of the
next higher command.
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(5) Assuring detailed investigation by appropriate intelligence· units of new CBR
targets uncovered during operations; furnishing required assistance in completing
CBR target investigations begun earlier
by other units; providing assistance to
CD (TI)'s operating in the army group
area but not assigned or attached to the
army group.

19. (UNCLASSIFIED) Field Army Chemical Officer
a. General. The TOE does not provide for a
Chemical Corps intelligence subsection within the
chemical section of the field army. CD(TI)'s
may be assigned to the field army to assist the chemical officer in the tactical and technical aspects of his
intelligence mission.
b. Tactical Intelligence Functions. The tactical
intelligence duties and responsibilities of the field
army chemical officer, under the general staff coordination of G2, will include(1) The supervision of all intelligence activities
of field army Chemical Corps units to
insure maximum utilization of all available
sources of information and materials of
intelligence value.
(2) The full utilization and exploitation of all
CBR intelligence developed by field army
units for maximum benefit to the field army.
Assistance of higher echelons should be
sought whenever local exploitation is not
feasible.
22
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(3) Cooperation and liaison with other staff and
intelligence agencies to obtain information
and materials of CBR intelligence value.
(4) The collection, critical comparison (collation),
evaluation, and interpretation of information
and materials forwarded by Chemical Corps
personnel and units of lower commands.
(5) The prompt dissemination of pertinent CBR
intelligence information and reports to
higher, lower, and adjacent commands.
c. Technical Intelligence Functions. The specific
technical intelligence duties and responsibilities of
the field army chemical officer, under the general
staff coordination of G2, will include(1) The operational control of assigned or
attached CD(TI)'s to insure maximum
recovery and collection of captured CBR
items, exploitation of CBR intelligence
targets and other sources of information,
and utilization of the CBR materiel and
military intelligence developed within the
army area (par. 18b(2)).
(2) The maintenance of a suitable target file for
his area of operations.
(3) Cooperation with representatives of other
technical services and intelligence agencies
to obtain samples of captured enemy
materiel of CBR intelligence interest.
(4) The furnishing of technical assistance to
chemical and other depots as required for
inspection, study, evaluation, and preparation of reports on captured CBR items.
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(5) The prompt distribution of completed re-

ports to field army G2, and higher commands, on the processing of captured CBR
items and the dissemination of information
and intelligence developed from them; also
the transmission of samples of such items to
the chemical officers of higher commands.
20. (UNCLASSIFIED) Corps Chemical Officer
Since the army corps is primarily a tactical unit,
only those factors of military and CBR intelligence
which have a direct influence on tactical operations
will be of primary concern to the corps.
a. The corps chemical officer must maintain
liaison with all components of the corps to gain
prompt knowledge of CBR or related intelligence
which will affect corps operations. Conversely, such
liaison is also necessary for the prompt dissemination
of military and CBR intelligence obtained through
corps agencies or from high commands.
b. Under special conditions, Chemical Detachments (Technical Intelligence) from the field army
may be attached to the corps under the operational
control of the corps chemical officer.
c. When an army corps operates independently,
the corps chemical officer assumes the intelligence
responsibilities and duties of a field army chemical
officer.
21. (UNCLASSIFIED) Division Chemical Officer
The division chemical officer, under the general
staff coordination of G2, has the following intelligence
responsibilities:

24
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a. The supervision of CBR intelligence activities
and cooperation with other technical services and
intelligence agencies to insure maximum recovery
and recollection of captured enemy CBR materiel.
b. Technical supervision and operational control
of CD(TI)'s attached or assigned from higher
command.
c. Technical supervision of captured enemy CBR
materiel, including the establishment and operation
of a system for its evacuation, dissemination of information about its tactical capabilities and limitations,
instruction of personnel in its characteristics and use,
and submission of reports on its processing required
by G2 or the chemical officer of the next higher
command.
22. (UNCLASSIFIED) Unit Commanders

The unit commanding officer is responsible for the
collection of CBR intelligence material and intelligence of a tactical nature. Since he is close to the
source of enemy CBR information and intelligence,
he must expedite the flow of such materials to the
appropriate intelligence agencies of higher command
for study, evaluation, and disposition. He is also
responsible for the preservation of captured enemy
CBR materiel suitable for technical exploitation by
qualified CBR intelligence personnel.
23. (UN CLASSIFIED) Chemical Corps Units

Personnel of Chemical Corps units may assist in
the location and collection of technical information
through early contact with captured enemy person-
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nel. Chemical Corps unit personnel may perform
the following specific CBR intelligence functions:
a. The prevention of careless handling of captured
CBR materiel before its intelligence value and usefulness can be fully ascertained by qualified personnel.
b. The recognition of enemy equipment or supplies
which appear to be of special CBR intelligence
interest to the command, the chemical service or
other technical service.
c. The recognition of the presence of individual
prisoners of war ·(or civilians) with specialized
knowledge valuable to one of the intelligence agencies.
d. The prompt notification of the appropriate
intelligence agency concerning any of the elements
mentioned above.

26
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CHAPTER 4 (CONFIDENTIAL)
OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES
24. (CONFIDENTIAL) Sources of Information

a. (UNCLASSIFIED) General. Many agencies,
civilian and military, in the zone of the interior and
in the theater of operations may serve as sources of
information.
b. (UNCLASSIFIED) Liaison. In all phases of
CBR intelligence, liaison with other intelligence
agencies and technical services is of primary importance in securing information.
(1) Purpose of liaison actimti~s. Liaison activities are designed to make intelligence and
information of CBR significance available
to appropriate Chemical Corps agencies.
(2) Contacts. Effective liaison activities depend
in large measure upon the ingenuity and
acumen of Chemical Corps personnel
charged with CBR intelligence functions.
In general, effective and informative contacts must be established with the following
groups whenever possible:
(a) Military intelligence. Close liaison should
be maintained with intelligence staff sections at all levels of command to secure
the tactical or combat intelligence required for effective employment of
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Chemical Corps units, to gain introduction to new sources of CBR information,
to ascertain the location of and gain
access to CBR intelligence targets, and
to arrange for prisoner-of-war interrogations.
(b) Technical intelligence coordinators. Technical intelligence coordinators are normally assigned to the field army under
prov1s10ns of TOE 30-15, Military
Intelligence Battalion, Field Army.
They assist the technical services in
obtaining enemy technical documents
and in prisoner-of-war interrogations rela ting to materiel for which they are
responsible. The technical intelligence
coordinator also assists in obtaining
items of captured materiel in which CBR
intelligence personnel are interested but
for which another technical service has
the primary responsibility.
(c) Other technical services. Close liaison,
with appropriate level G2 coordination,
must be maintained at all times and at
all echelons with the intelligence elements
of the other technical services to effect
constant interchange of information and
to develop new sources of information
through targets located by intelligence
elements of the other services.
(d) Higher, lower, and adjacent units. For
proper functioning and maximum effec28
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tiveness of CBR intelligence activities,
there must be free and rapid interchange
of information at all levels of command
and in all directions. Lower echelons
must forward all pertinent information to
higher echelons as speedily as possible
without sacrificing full local exploitation.
Higher commands must keep all lower
echelons fully informed of important
intelligence developments and must assist in maintaining current the essential
elements of information required of each
unit.
(e) Navy and Air Force. Every effort should
be made to exchange CBR information
with the other services.
(f) Allied armed forces intelligence agencies.
Under certain conditions, and for certain
types of information, communication with
intelligence agencies of the armed forces
of allied nations can be accomplished
through theater G2.
(g) United States civilian intelligence agencies.
By arrangement through G2, normally at
theater headquarters, liaison may be
established with all United States civilian
agencies (operating in the theater) which
may possess or have access to CBR
information. Agencies devoted to research and development, civilian chemical and biological research, and technical
and industrial problems may be included.
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c. (UNCLASSIFIED) Published Data.
(1) Information from higher headquarters. Information from higher headquarters may be
furnished in a variety of forms and may deal
with many different intelligence problems.
Documents, surveys, and reports prepared
within the Department of the Army may
first be utilized. These include National
Intelligence Surveys, CBR studies of various areas, and special reports prepared
from information and material available
to the Chief Chemical Officer and the
Department of the Army. In the same
category are equivalent reports prepared
and published by other technical services of
the Departments of the Army, the Navy,
and the Air Force. In addition, similar
surveys and reports prepared by allied
governments are usually made available to
the technical service intelligence units of
the Army. These reports contain information dealing with CBR problems in the
areas covered and often furnish a basic
background upon which current intelligence operations may be superimposed.
Of special interest will be certain geographical considerations, climatology, natural resources, and industries which can
give a primary understanding of CBR
potential. Peoples may be better understood by an appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions under which they
30
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live, their psychological makeup, and the
cultural advantages which they enjoy.
CBR capabilities may best be understood
by a consideration of the industrial potential; numbers and training of scientists;
numbers, sizes, and types of laboratories,
experimental stations, and testing facilities;
and the activities of chemical, biological
and physical science associations and organizations. Information concerning laboratories, industrial establishments, educational institutions, and research foundations specializing in CBR and related fields
will have particular CBR intelligence value.
(2) Chemical, biological, radiological, and related
technical publications. Information is found
in a diverse group of chemical and technical
publications which may be available in military and civilian facilities both in the zone
of the interior and in a theater of operations.
These publications may include books,
journals, monographs, maps, statistical reports, yearbooks, publications of research
institutes, and industrial and trade papers.
They cover a variety of subjects and often
provide much detniled information. However, since some of the material from these
sources may be outdated, liaison with military intelligence and with the intelligence
sections of other technical services must be
maintained to secure all current information. Previous publications may often be
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brought up to date by careful questioning
of individuals recently sojourning in areas
under consideration, especially if these persons have had chemical or other technical
training.
d. (UNCLASSIFIED) Enemy Order of Battle. A
careful analysis of all enemy order of battle reports
dealing with the chemical service may permit the
development of a fairly comprehensive study of enemy CBR organization, supply training, and capabilities. In addition, some knowledge may be gained
of the basis on which chemical units and personnel
are assigned to enemy forces.
e. (UNCLASSIFIED) Prisoner-o..f-Wa,r Interrogation. Interrogation of prisoners of war is a.n important and difficult task whose techniques must be acquired through careful training (FM 30-15). Although interrogators must be trained in interrogation techniques, it is equally important that they
have an adequate knowledge of the subject they are
to explore in questioning prisoners of war. Chemical
Staff officers may recommend EEI to the G2, which
will be disseminated as specified orders or requests
to interrogators of prisoners of war concerning specific CBR items of equipment, activities, materiel
or installations and facilities. Selected Chemical
Corps intelligence personnel should be trained in
POW interrogation procedures. With the knowledge
and assistance of appropriate G2 agencies, qualified
Chemical Corps intelligence personnel will be furnished upon request to assist IPW units in the inter32
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rogation of knowledgeable prisoners of war (par.
14b(6) ).
(I) Chemical service prisoners. Prisoners of war
from enemy chemical services should be interrogated by IPW units with the assistance
of Chemical Corps intelligence personnel.
Information to be obtained from enemy
chemical service personnel includes CBR procedures and techniques, special CBR problems currently in evidence or anticipated,
current immunization procedures, antigas
precautions, and evidence indicating the
possibility of the introduction of diseaseproducing organisms or vectors of disease,
and chemical, incendiary, or radiological
agents as instruments of warfare. In every
case where the prisoner gives evidence of
highly specialized knowledge, the assistance
of additional qualified personnel, from the
Chemical Corps or other technical services,
should be sought to obtain maximum benefit.
(2) Other enemy scientific personnel. Additional
information of a similar nature, less detailed
but often very informative, may be obtained
by routine questioning of all enemy civilian
scientific and professional personnel encountered in occupied areas.
f. (CONFIDENTIAL) Captured Documents and
Materiel. CBR intelligence personnel are responsible
for investigations and primary evaluation of captured
enemy CBR materiel for intelligence purposes.
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Every effort should be made to secure representative
samples of materiel from the enemy installation
where found rather than to wait for eventual removal of the bulk supplies to chemical or other
depots.
( 1) (UN CLASSIFIED) Captured documents.
All captured documents of CBR intelligence
value will be handled as prescribed in FM
30-15. When examined systematically by
competent personnel, captured documents
are often valuable sources of information on
enemy organization and order of battle;
types, characteristics and specifications of
equipment; manpower and manpower reserves; training standards and procedures;
special CBR problems, technical procedures, and supply. Any and all documents
are utilized that deal with the structure
and function of the enemy chemical service,
the troop basis on which chemical personnel
and units are supplied, the operation of the
enemy chemical service, and civilian CBR
problems, resources and capabilities.
(2) (CONFIDENTIAL)
Captured materiel.
1tems of enemy materiel and equipment
which are novel and apparently of CBR
intelligence value should be fully investigated. Special attention should be directed
toward the discovery of any equipment or
materiel suggestive of the study of CBR
agents as weapons of warfare. Valuable
intelligence about the quantity and quality
34
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of enemy CBR supplies and enemy production capabilities can be developed from
examination of common chemicals and other
items, including their containers, and by
making note of all factory addresses, trademarks, special identifying symbols, inspection stamps or markings, and dates of
manufacture.
(3) (UNCLASSIFIED) Safeguarding captured
materiel and documents.
(a) Individual responsibilities. All individuals in the Army and all those attached
for duty with its forces are responsible
for promptly turning in or reporting the
presence of captured materiel to the commanding officer of their own or nearest
unit.
The theater commander may
exempt certain items from this procedure.
(b) Unit commander's responsibilities.
All
unit commanders are responsible for
insuring that captured materiel in their
zone of action or operations is properly
safeguarded, reported to the G2 of their
own or of the next higher command,
promptly turned over to the interested
technical service, or left in position if
immediate use or destruction is not necessary (FM 30-16).
(4) (UN CLASSIFIED) Processing of captured
documents and materiel.
(a) Objectives. The four principal objectives
in the handling of captured enemy CBR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
items are: prompt development of counterweapons and countertactics with special reference to enemy intentions in the
use of CBR agents as instruments of war;
prompt exploitation of new ideas in CBR
techniques or materiel for our own benefit; early deductions as to the state of
enemy resources in CBR supply and
equipment; and use by our own forces of
enemy CBR materiel, including literature and other aids to assist in training.
(b) Responsibilities. In order to make full
use of the limited specialist personnel
available, responsibility for the achievement of the above objectives is divided
between Chemical Detachments (Technical Intelligence) and supply sections,
as outlined in paragraphs 12 and 15.
g. (UNCLASSIFIED) Enemy Civilian Personnel.
The nature of CBR problems and of the type of
information which may be useful makes it desirable
that specially qualified enemy civilians working in
chemistry, biology, radiology, or the allied sciences
be thoroughly interrogated. Such individuals may
furnish valuable information on the status of enemy
research and development, manufacturing processes
and items being produced, disease incidence, vaccines and antibiotics developed to combat diseases,
size and location of stockpiles, and psychological
and morale factors among civilians. In addition,
they may furnish vital information about intelligence targets or conditions within enemy forces,
36
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in ·which case the appropriate S2 or G2 should be
notified.
h. (UNCLASSIFIED) Enemy Civilian CBR Facilities. Laboratories, universities, research centers,
manufacturing plants, and special facilities are
valuable sources of CBR information and should be
thoroughly investigated and exploited whenever ·
possible.
25. (UNCLASSIFIED) Tactical Essential Elements
of Information
a,. General. The principal objective for CBR
intelligence personnel and units during field operations is to furnish sufficient CBR intelligence to
allow maximum effective planning and execution
of CBR operations. To accomplish this goal, ·
intelligence activities are divided into three phases:
planning, combat, and post-combat. The intelligence requirements of each of these phases differ
in many respects. Therefore, a standard CBR
EEI (essential elements of information) will be composed of the following:
b. The Planning Phase. The essential elements of
information required for the proper planning of
CBR support for a combat operation include military
and CBR intelligence dealing with conditions under
which the operation will take place and the effect
of these conditions upon our own troops. Specifically, the EEI are as follows:
(1) CBR surveys of the areas of projected
operations to indicate terrain and climatic
features which may influence troop opera-
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tions in CBR warfare. Such surveys may
indicate the imminence of CBR warfare
and the problems which must be solved
to assure maintenance of the maximum
effective strength of our own troops.
(2) Order of battle (enemy strength and dispositions) and capabilities of resistance
to our forces.
(3) New CBR weapons, with their capabilities
and the need for protective measures and
special treatment for casualties.
(4) Enemy use of any special immunizing
procedures to protect their personnel against
BWagents.
(5) Terrain and enemy installations of all
types, for use in planning the location of
chemical installations and lines of evacuation.
(6) Condition and loca.tion of transporta.tion
facilities.
(7) Possible laboratory sites in pre-existing
facilities.
(8) Communications facilities.
c. The Combat Phase. During combat the rapidly
changing tactical situation requires additional activity in making proper disposition of units and
CBR supplies to best support the contemplated
action, and to afford necessary protection to troops
in areas recently taken from the enemy. The essential elements of information required under these
conditions include the following:
18
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(1) Enemy strength, capability of resistance,

and locations of CBR units.
(2) Detailed information on areas in the path
of the projected advance, particularly
CBR intelligence targets, possibilities, and
problems.
(3) The status of enemy CBR equipment and
supplies, including any new equipment
which might be used by our own forces.
(4) Information necessary to keep current the
intelligence material furnished during the
planning phase.
(5) Continuation of all possible inquiries into
enemy potentialities for employment of
unorthodox methods of warfare, including
the use of any special immunizing procedures designed to protect enemy personnel against BW agents that would indicate the need for special measures to insure protection of our personnel.
d. Post-Combat Phase. The essential elements of
information required during the post-combat phase
properly include not only data outlined above, which
may be secured by investigation and interrogation,
but also full exploitation of captured CBR information and resources. In both instances it is essential
to insure full and rapid exploitation and utilization
of all CBR information which may be of value in
future operations or which is required by CBR
research and development agencies.

CONFIDENTIAL

39

CONFIDENTIAL
26. (UNCLASSIFIED) Technical Essential Elements of Information

In addition to those factors influencing chemical
service operations mentioned previously, the following technical EEI are included in the CBR intelligence plan:
a. Details of new or improved CBR materiel, including supplies, chemicals, antibiotics, chemotherapeutic agents, insecticides, biologicals, and instruments as designed and used by the enemy, together
with an estimation of the possibility of their use by
our o-wn forces.
b. Chemical supplies and equipment, including
quantities, methods of packaging, and instructions
which may indicate amounts of the supplies available. The disappearance of certain standard items
from the supplies normally found with chemical
units gives prompt indication of items in short
supply. l\1ethods of packaging and labeling may
also serve to indicate shortages by indicating that
certain materials are to be used only for certain
purposes, with substitutes otherwise utilized.
c. Composition, packaging, and labeling of CBR
materials, with (especially) their quality and availability.
d. Careful investigation of all possible sources,
locations, laboratories, research institutions, and
available personnel for evidences of the emplo,yment
of CBR materials as agents of warfare.
e. Careful scrutiny of all supplies and stores of
biologicals, vaccines, serums, and related products
40
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for new items or preparations possibly intended for
BW use.
j. Surveys of all enemy documents, publications,
and field orders for possible information on enemy
CBR supply and mate::-iel resources and potentialities.
g. Check of sources mentioned above for information on new discoveries or techniques, or improvements on existing methods in CBR or allied sciences.
h. Detailed interrogation of selected enemy prisoners of war to obtain further details on information
desired.
27. (UNCLASSIFIED) Special Operations

Special operations, primarily those planned for
arctic or tropical areas, require only the essential
elements of information previously described. However, it is the task of Chemical Corps personnel to
anticipate the importance of certain information
necessary for successful operations in these areas.
Special emphasis is placed on the effects of climatological factors upon CBR agents in combat operations.
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CHAPTER 5

(UNCLASSIFIED)

RECORDS AND REPORTS
28. Records
a. Purpose. Records and reports are used for the
systematic arrangement of all information in order
to facilitate its evaluation and use by all agencies
and to allow rapid and accurate dissemination.
b. Methods of Recording. In general, methods of
recording information are in accordance with theater
directives but must be adapted to the needs of the
individual unit and service. Proper and prompt
dissemination of intelligence is of primary importance; records are a secondary consideration.
c. Standard Records. Following the initial examination, each item of information must be recorded
so as to facilitate reference and study. The item
may be recorded in an accession sheet, a daily
journal, a worksheet, a situation map, a target folder,
or in any or all combinations of these. Selection of
the types of records to be kept by a specific chemical
unit depends upon the need for the information they
will contain. Simplification is desirable.
(1) Accession sheet. The accession sheet is a.
continuous record of all documents, papers,
and reports received in the chemical intelligence unit. Material is listed in the order
of its receipt. Each document or report is
given an identifying number which appears
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on the accession sheet and on the document
itself if it is to be retained in the intelligence
files. The accession sheet also contains the
date of receipt of the item, its source, subject, and disposition. If the report is filed,
the file number is recorded; if it is forwarded,
the destination is recorded.
(2) Journal. The journal contains briefs of
important conferences, records of any action
taken by the unit or its personnel, and
similar matters pertaining to the intelligence
section. The journal may be kept in
synopsis form and is a permanent record.
The journal is closed daily, and a copy is
made available for consolidation with other
journals of the headquarters. The form of
the journal may be designated by the
appropriate headquarters, or it may follow
the form prescribed in FM 101-5 ·and
FM 30-5.
(3) CBR intelligence worksheet. A CBR intelligence worksheet is designed primarily to
consolidate, as received, all items on a
particular subject. Worksheets are maintained on special problems for the purpose
of preparing daily intelligence summaries
and reports. The information on the worksheet, though not necessarily chronological,
groups all items related to a particular
subject. The worksheet is temporary and
not a part of the permanent record (FM
30-5).
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(4) Situation map.

The situation map, as employed in CBR intelligence, is designed to
indicate graphically those details of the
intelligence situation vital to the proper
conduct of offensive and defensive CBR
operations. The map shows as much of
the pertinent elements of the tactical situation as is necessary. Enemy headquarters,
installations and supply depots of interest,
as well as CBR intelligence targets, may be
shown. Ordinarily, it is more desirable to
indicate changing information on overlays,
maintained daily, rather than on a permanent map.
(5) Target folders. Folders or files should be
maintained on all potential CBR intelligence targets in the projected area of operations. All pertinent information on any
one target may then be filed in the appropriate folder as received. By the time the
target is available for exploitation, sufficient
background data will have been amassed to
facilitate final investigation and evaluation.
d. Files. In addition to maintaining records, it
may be necessary to employ a filing plan suitable
for cataloging all CBR intelligence information, especially that required for future use. An appropriate
filing system also facilitates comparison and evaluation of information and dissemination of intelligence.
Any systematic filing system may be employed
which makes information readily available. At
higher command levels, the use of a filing system

"
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patterned after that used in the Chemical Corps
Intelligence Agency, Department of the Army,
Washington 25, D. C., is recommended. Information
about the system is available on request.
29. Reports

a. General. CBR intelligence is of value only
when made available sufficiently in advance to allow
individuals or units concerned to utilize it fully.
Each item should be carefully examined by a qualified officer or noncommissioned officer to determine
its nature, urgency, and proper dissemination within
the organization and to higher, lower, and adjacent
units, G2, and the technical intelligence coordinator.
The method of dissemination should be in accord
with the importance or urgency of the information.
All dissemination should be recorded in the daily
journal. To keep the record complete, copies of
reports sent out should, if possible, be attached to the
daily journal.
b. Responsibility. Responsibility for the preparation of suitable reports on CBR intelligence investigations, interrogations, and other activities rests with
the individuals or units who have carried out the
specific assignments. Reports cover examinations
of enemy equipment, CBR supplies, and materiel;
examination and translation of captured enemy
documents; investigation_of CBR intelligence targets;
and detailed interrogation of prisoners of war and
other specially qualified enemy civilian or military
personnel.
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c. Elements of Reports. The form of a CBR intelligence report depends in large measure upon the subject of the report and the method used to obtain the
information. To insure maximum utility, however,
all reports should contain certain specific data. It is
essential to include sufficient background details
on the individual, place, or item under investigation
to enable the recipient of the report to gain an adequate understanding of the purposes of the investigation. In addition, these details will assist in
evaluating the information. The investigator preparing the report should include his personal estimate of the source and the reliability of the report.
Reports should be as detailed as possible; separate
reports on different subjects from the same source
may be necessary for brevity and clarity (app. II).
d. 1llethods of Reporting.
(1) Personal contact. It is frequently possible
for CBR intelligence to be transmitted
directly in person or by telephone to those
immediately concerned. vVhere necessary,
urgent information may be dispatched by
special messenger.
(2) Conferences. Exchange of information is
facilitated by frequent conferences between
individuals concerned. To make full and
immediate use of current intelligence, it is
desirable, especially at higher levels, that
intelligence personnel confer frequently
with appropriate staff members. These.
conferences are particularly useful since
they give other individuals full opportunity
46
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to outline new and current essential elements of information based on the changing
tactical situation and intelligence previously
received. In turn, this insures that the
intelligence section is fully cognizant of all
the requirements of the headquarters and
will anticipate future needs.
(3) Periodic report. A periodic report or summary, briefly outlining the important information of the day, may be prepared for
distribution among authorized personnel of
the chemical section, to other technical
intelligence services, and to G2. A summary is issued only if required by headquarters and if the information warrants
such dissemination. The periodic report
may cover any given period, and may be
issued as required.
(4) CBR intelligence summaries. CBR intelligence summaries are prepared as authoritative and accurate reviews or summaries
of any information available on a special
topic and phase of CBR intelligence. An
example of a summary prepared during the
planning phase of an operation might be a
CBR survey of the area of projected operation. During the combat phase, a summary might be prepared on the status of
enemy CBR supply or the types of protective clothing and devices issued to enemy
troops. Summaries should deal with current problems and should attempt to fur-
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nish sufficient information to give a true
picture of the enemy's plans, capabilities,
or intentions. In addition, technical summaries on speGial items of enemy equipment
may be issued. These summaries will be
devoted to new and unusual items of equipment particularly suitable for use by
friendly forces. Organization and equipment of enemy chemical units and the basis
of their assignment should be reviewed
frequently, and kept current in appropriate
summaries.
(5) Special reports. Reports on special or emergency situations may be prepared as required for authorized persons, agencies
or headquarters. Reports on evidence of
enemy attempts to use CBR agents offensively will be included in this category.
All information of this nature will be treated
with the utmost urgency. Details of the
suspected incident will be transmitted by
the most expeditious means available, consistent with security, to the chemical officer
and G2 of the command concerned so that
prompt and full evaluation may be made
and prompt countermeasures instituted.
e. Dissemination.
(1) Reports of all investigations of CBR intelligence targets, equipment, materiel, documents, and personnel will be forwarded
promptly to the staff chemical officer of the
headquarters to which the CD(TI) is as48
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signed or attached. When deemed desirable, copies of these reports may be
furnished directly to commanders or S2's
of units in the immediate vicinity or adjacent to the investigation, especially where
such action may be of assistance to local
units.
(2) All staff reports prepared by staff chemical
sections, or received by them from investigating detachments, should be made available to the chemical officer and G2 of the
next higher command. Copies may also
be sent, as necessary, to the intelligence
units of other technical services.
(3) In addition to the local dissemination described above, all CBR intelligence reports
processed through technical channels are
forwarded to higher commands in accordance with current instructions. Information copies of appropriate reports prepared
at army leve] are sent to army group or
communications zone headquarters if desirable, but are, in any case, forwarded to the
command designated by the theater commander.
(4) Appropriate CBR intelligence material prepared in the theater should be transmitted
promptly to the Department of the Army
for such use and additional dissemination
as may be required. This policy applies
particularly to technical summaries on
enemy CBR equipment and techniques.
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CHAPTER 6 (UNCLASSIFIED)
SECURITY
30. Security Functions of Chemical Corps Technical
Intelligence Units
a. Objective. Supplementing operational security
requirements for safeguarding personnel and property, additional responsibilities are imposed by the
necessity of safeguarding from loss or compromise all
that military information which is or should be
classified in the interest of national defense, or preserving the security of military operations.
b. Responsibilities. While the Chief of Staff,
United States Army exercises control over all
policies relating to the security of such classified
information, the direct responsibility for commonsense application of all prescribed basic safeguards
rests upon both the commander and each individual
who is in a physical position to exercise direct
security control over classified documents, communications, or materiel.
c. Application.
(1) The protection of classified matter must be
an integral part of each task and ideally is
never an additionally imposed burden.
Chemical Corps units, through sound
direction by their responsible officers and
alert performance of duty by all sub50
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ordinates, must achieve the desired balance
between the requirement(s) for absolute
security of classified information and the
requirement for a relatively unhampered
flow of intelligence information to insure
the success of assigned missions.
(2) Scope, methods, and procedures prescribed
by the Department of the Army may
change from time to time. They are published principally in AR 380-series, of
which AR 380-5 is the basic document.
They may be augmented through supplementary instructions, published as needed
by the commanders primarily responsible.
Chemical Corps personnel are responsible
as individuals for becoming familiar with,
and applying, the instructions as they are
published.
31. Specialized Security Responsibilities
Aside from the commander's operational responsibilities, security discipline in Chemical Corps
units, as in other units of the Army establishment, is
primarily individual in nature. The usual considerations are physical security, movement security, safeguarding classified defense information
including the prompt reporting of observed breaches
of security, visitor control, the suppression of careless of irresponsible talk, counterintelligence, and an
awareness of Special Warfare operations. Specific
support missions will be assigned, and guidance
provided, by competent authority.
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32. Event of Capture
All Chemical Corps personnel will be instructed
of their rights and responsibilities as prisoners of
war. An understanding of the reasoning developed
in the U. S. Fighting Man's Code (DA Pam 21-71)
is essential to the individual's ability to survive and
to render continued military service after capture.
Every soldier must adhere to the provisions of the
Code and give only his name, grade, service number,
and date of birth in the event of capture.

GZ
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CHAPTER 7 (UNCLASSIFIED)
TRAINING
33. Purpose
The purpose of training Chemical Corps personnel
in military intelligence is to insure the efficient performance of intelligence functions by both officer
and enlisted personnel. It is of paramount importance to instill in all Chemical Corps personnel an
appreciation of their individual intelligence obligation. How this is to be accomplished depends to a
large extent upon the imagination and initiative of
unit commanders and chemical staff officers.
34. Scope
Intelligence training at all kvels of command includes appropriate instruction in the collection,
recording, evaluation, and interpretation of information in military intelligence; in the dissemination and
application of CBR intelligence; and in the proper
planning and application of counterintelligence to
assist commanders at all levels to plan and execute
offensive and defensive CBR operations in furtherance of the command mission.
35. Responsibility
a. Chemical Corps Un'it Commanders. In the
Chemical Corps unit, CBR intelligence is produced
to enable the commander to perform his mission
properly. Therefore, all commanders must under-
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stand the need for and the methods of obtaining such
intelligence. Intelligence training is the responsibility of the commander, who will insure that all
Chemical Corps personnel of his command understand and can adequately perform their intelligence
duties.
b. Staff Chemical 0.ffecers. The Staff Chemical
officer of a major command may have a subsection
of his office devoted to intelligence functions. These
functions are his responsibility, and related operations
are carried out under the general staff coordination
of G2. The chemical staff officer is responsible for
the proper implementation and supervision of CBR
intelligence training within subordinate commands
in compliance with established training directives.

36. Relationships
The chemical officer at each level of command
must cooperate and coordinate w-ith 02 of the command to provide adequate instruction and training
in intelligence matters. CBR intelligence portions
of the unit training program are coordinated with
G2, but the execution of the program is supervised
by the chemical officer. Intelligence training should
be integrated with other types of training when the
total value of the training will be enhanced by the
combination.

37. Personnel
a. Chemical Corps Personnel.
(1) All Chemical Corps personnel are potential
collectors of military information including
54
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CBR intelligence information anct must,
therefore, be trained in collecting and reporting such i~formation. Each should be able
to observe and report enemy attitude,
CBR equipment or protective devices, and
information about the use or contemplated
use of CBR agents as weapons.
(2) The only valid limitation upon the scope of
reports is the inability of the individual to
see, think, remember, or transmit his observations, evaluations, or conclusions.
(3) Since chemical service installations in the
combat zone may indicate tactical distribution of troops, it is essential that all Chemical Corps personnel receive instruction
and training in counterintelligence.
b. Chemical Corps Intelligence Officers and Enlisted Personnel. Chemical Corps personnel who
perform specific CBR intelligence functions at higher
levels of command will receive specialized instruction and training in military and chemical subjects.
This instruction will normally cover CBR materiel,
equipment, literature, and documents; enemy CBR
tactics and doctrine; climatic and terrain features
which may influence CBR warfare operations;
interrogation of knowledget1,ble enemy prisoners of
,var on CBR and related topics; and the preparation,
and submission of required intelligence reports
surveys, memoranda, or special studies.
c. Chemical Detachments (Technical Intelligence).
(CD(TI)'s), (TOE 3-500R), in addition to the
subjects outlined in b above, will receive detailed
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instruction in collection, evaluation, and disposition
of CBR materiel and equipment of all types (FM
30-16).

38. Methods of Instruction
Instruction methods prescribed by FM 21-5
apply to all phases of military intelligence training.
Such training is best carried out in centralized
training units or military schools. During all its
phases, the program should include individual, unit,
and combined training in the field.

56
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CHAPTER 8 (UNCLASSIFIED)
CBR INTELLIGENCE IN ZONE OF THE
INTERIOR
39. Mission
The current mission of the Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency is to serve the CBR intelligence needs
(except counterintelligence) of the Department of the
Army and the Chemical Corps (par. 5).
40. Functions
The functions of the Chemical Corps Intelligence
Agency may be summarized under two headings:
intelligence and training.
a. Intelligence . .
(1) Collection and dissemination.
(a) Directs the CBR intelligence collection
effort and disseminates detailed information and intelligence from all possible
sources on CBR supplies, production,
research, and resources, and on related
activities for all areas outside the continental United States to meet Chemical
Corps and Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army requirements.
(b) Exercises staff supervision of certain
CD (Tl) units in the ZI.
(c) Coordinates CBR intelligence with other
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members of the intelligence community
in the ZI and with the DA Army Staff.
(d) :Maintains a systematic file of all documents and other materials collected to
insure availability and rapid dissemination when required.
(e) Acts in an advisory capacity to Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence and all elements of the Chemical Corps on CBR
intelligence and related matters.
(2) Production of intelligence.
(a) Analyzes, evaluates, and interprets the
information collected and prepares and
submits for publication as needed regular
and special reports or surveys on matters
listed in (l)(a) above.
(b) Prepa.res CBR surveys on various areas
of strategic and tactical importance required by the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, US Army, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
(c) Reviews published surveys and adds current information as it becomes available
in order to incorporate new information,
and keep surveys up-to-date.
b. Training Responsibilities.
(1) Develops techniques for and assists in
developing CBR intelligence training programs and materials.
(2) Exercises staff supervision over the preassignment training in the ZI of Chemical
Corps intelligence personnel and units.
58
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APPENDIX I (UNCLASSIFIED)
REFERENCES
DA Pam 320-1

Dictionary of U. S. Army Terms for
Joint Usage.
DA Pam 380-5
Military Security-Safeguarding Defense Information.
DA Pam 380-55
Military Security-Safeguarding Defense Information-Movement of
Persons and Things.
Military Security-as required.
DA Pam 380-series
DA Pam 381-25 (C)
Military Intelligence-Army Intelligence Collection Instructions (U).
DA Pam 381-220= (C) Foreign Materiel for Intelligence Purposes (U).
SR 320-5-1
Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms.
Staff Chemical Officer.
FM 3-9
F:'.\I 9-40
Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance
and Disposal.
FlVI 19-30
Physical Security of Military and Industrial Installations.
Handling Prisoners of War.
FM 19-40
FM 21--10
Defense Against CBR Attack.
FM 30-5 (0)
Combat Intelligence.
F1I 30-15
Examination of Personnel and Documents.
F:M 30-16 (C)
Technical Intelligence (U).
DA Pam 21-71
The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.
DA Pam 30-12-1 (S) Foreign Military Weapons and Equipment, Vol. VIII: Chemical Equip·
ment, Sec. I USSR (U).
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DA Pam 30-12-2 (S)

DA Pam 30-14-1 (S)

DA Pam 30-26
TOE 3-500R

Go

Foreign Military Weapons and Equipffent, Chemical Equipment, Sec. II
Sino-Soviet Bloc (Less USSR) (U).
Foreign Military Weapons and Equipment, Vol. X: Ammunition (Sec. I
USSR) (U).
A Guide to the Collection of Technical
Intelligence.
Chemical Service Organizations.
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APPENDIX II (CONFIDENTIAL)
CBR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS
Page

Form 1- Outline, Foreign Materiel Technical Report
(FMTR) _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _
Form 2-Outline, Captured Materiel Technical Report
(CMTR) _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _____ _ ___ __ _ ___ ___
Form 3-Outline, Technical Intelligence Target Report
(TITR) _ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _
Form 4-Outline, Foreign Materiel Evaluation Report
(FMER) _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _
Example 1-Mechanical Requirements, CBR Technical Intelligence Reports (all)_________
Example 2-Format, Title and Signature Pages, Technical Intelligence Reports (all)________
Example 3-(CONFIDENTIAL) Captured Materiel
Technical Report (C MTR) _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _
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Form 1 (UNCLASSIFIED) FOREIGN MATERIEL TECHNICAL REPORT (FMTR)

REPORT OUTLINE
(All headings shown below, with appropriate
numbers and letters, should appear in the report.
The omission of text under any heading should be
explained.)
I. ABSTRACT:
Prepare a brief general synopsis of the report,
covering as many of the significant points listed
below as practicable. "Authorization" and "Items
To Be Examined" should be omitted, but the object
of the work should be stated.
II. AUTHORIZATION:
Reference any correspondence directly concerning
sample. Ordinarily a job number under a miscellaneous project should be obtained to cover the
examination.
III. ITEM TO BE EXAMINED:
In a general statement, reference any available
reports on examination of the item by other agencies
and any military intelligence reports concerning it.
Any data or well-founded assumptions on use or
issue (actual or intended) may be included here.
IV. PHYSICAL, CHE}v.lICAL, AND PHYSIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS:
This section should be subdivided in an appropriate
manner, marking the main subdivisions "A, B, C,"
62
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and so on, and the next subdivisions "1, 2, 3,"
and so on. The nature of these subdivisions will
vary according to the item reported on, and may
best be determined by reference to issued FMTR's
on objects in the same general class. Subdivisions
may be changed as necessary.
V. FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Describe operation of the item.

VI. TACTICAL USE:
A precise analysis is not required here, but a
general statement of probable use should be made.

VII. COMPARISON WITH COMPARABLE U.S.
EQUIP1.v.IENT:
In preparing this section, the following points
should be considered:
Compactness
Weight
Simplicity of design
Efficiency
Simplicity in operation
Superiority of component parts, either in construction or in materiel used
The extent to which critical materials are used
General effectiveness in field use

VIII. DEDUCTIONS AS TO FOREIGN RESOURCES:
This section loses much of its significance during
peacetime when only deductions indicating unusual
conditions should be mentioned.
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points should be covered:
Desirable features, if any, to be incorporated in
U. S. materiel.
Counteragents. These recommendations, if any,
should be of a general nature and should refer
to a counteragent for the group to which the
examined object belongs, rather than to a
counteragent for only one item.
Need for further tests, field trials, or surveillance.
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Form 2 (UNCLASSIFIED) CAPTURED MATERIEL TECHNICAL REPORT (CMTR)

REPORT OUTLINE
(The numbers and letters used for the several
headings shown below should be used in the report.
Irrelevant headings may be omitted.)
I. ABSTRACT:
Prepare a brief general synopsis of the report
covering as many of the significant points listed
below as practicable.

II. INTRODUCTION:
A. Indicate disposition of sample and describe
means by which sample was forwarded.
B. Record any previous reports on item or on sim~
ilar items.

III. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF ITEM:
A. Circumstances under which item was found.
B. Give a general description of the item, paying
special and complete attention to identification
data. Refer to photos and drawings, or sketches,
attached.
IV. PHYSICAL AND/OR CHEMICAL CHARACTERISTICS:
A. Checklist should be developed as a guide to the
necessary content of this paragraph. A sample
checklist for a chemical agent isl. Color
2. Odor
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3. Specific gravity
4. Boiling point
5. Melting point
6. Vapor pressure
7. Chemical reactions
B. State any conclusions regarding the identity of
the materiel examined.
V. FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Describe the operation of the item, if a munition
or item of equipment, and its use, if a toxic agent.
Information such as duration of functioning, range,
delay features, physiological effects, and psychological effects should be included.

VI. TACTICAL USE:
State how the item is employed tactically by the
enemy, i. e., to deny ground 1 to harass, or to cause
casualties.
VIL COMPARISON WITH U.S. MATERIEL:
Compare with the most nearly comparable U. S.
item. Following are points for consideration:
A. Compactness
B. Weight
C. Simplicity of design
D. Simplicity of operation
E. Superiority of component parts
F. General effectiveness in field use- VIII. DEDUCTIONS AS TO ENEMY RESOURCES:
Any statement here should be substantiated with
all available data.
e&
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. Desirable features, if any, which should be
considered for incorporation in our own devices.
B. Counterweapons and countertactics as may be
necessary from field observation.
C. Need for providing literature and other aids to
assist in advising commanders on capabilities and
limitations of enemy materiel and, when required,
to assist in training troops in the use and maintenance of enemy materiel.
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Form 3 (UNCLASSIFIED) TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TARGET REPORT (TITR)

REPORT OUTLINE
(The numbers and letters used for the several
headings shown below should be used in the report.
Headings not pertinent may be omitted.)

I. ABSTRACT:
Prepare a brief general synopsis of the report
covering as many of the significant points listed
below as practicable.
II. INTRODUCTION:
A. General statement indicating type of target
such as:
1. Industrial plant
2. Key personnel
3. Research center
B. Directive and/or reasons for investigation of
the target.
C. Measures being taken to safeguard this target
for further study and/or potential future use.
III. DESCRIPTION OF TARGET:
Including the following in lettered paragraphs:
A. General description of target
B. Condition of target
C. Buildings and equipment
D. Materials and storage
68
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IV. INVESTIGATION OF THE TARGET:
Bring out sources of information:
A. Blueprints, flow charts, production processes,
and other documents.
B. Descriptive captions for photographs, drawings, diagrams of sketches attached.
V. GENERAL INFORMATION:
Give a nontechnical summary of relevant information on operation, production, safety devices, and
stockpiles.
VI. TECHNICAL INFORMATION:
The technical aspects, if determined, in operation
and production processes and chemical, biological,
or radiological safety features.
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Form 4 (UNCLASSIFIED) FOREIGN :MATERIEL EVALUATION REPORT (FMER)

REPORT OUTLINE
(All headings shown below should appear in the
report. The omission of text under any heading
should be explained.)
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS
IL PICTURE OF EXPLOITED ITEM
III. ABSTRACT
IV. INTRODUCTION
V. HISTORICAL
VI. DESCRIPTION (include Lab Reports)
VII. MARKINGS
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL DATA
IX. DISCUSSION
X. CONCLUSIONS
XI. APPENDICES
Detailed laboratory analysis reports, detailed photographs, bibliography, etc.,
are normally presented in appendices to
the report.
Note.
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Example 1. (UNCLASSIFIED) Suggested Mechanical Requirements For Field Originated
CBR Technical Intelligence Reports
(CMTR, FMTR, TITR, etc.).
1. PAPER: Letter size (8 in. x 10}~ in.), if possible
2. MARGINS: 1 inch on all 4 sides
3. SPACING: Double-space
4. PAGINATION: Page one (1) may well be a
photograph (or drawing) of the item reported on.
After the first page, the page number is centered
at the bottom of each page.
5. PHOTOGRAPHS, DRAWINGS ORTABLES:
Are located in the most appropriate section of
text or appendix. If there are many illustrations, the appendix is the preferred location, but
not at the sacrifice of continuity. Oversize
illustrations are not encouraged but may be
used if justified; fold-in is recommended if important detail is not damaged. Undersize illustrations should be mounted on a blank page of
standard size.
6. PARAGRAPHS: Are numbered consecutively
with Roman numerals. Subparagraphs are
lettered "A, B, 0". Sub-subparagraphs are
numbered "1, 2, 3".
7. FORMAT: See appendix II, examples 2 and 3.
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Example 2. (UNCLASSIFIED) Suggested Format
For Field Originated CBR Technical
Intelligence Reports
TITLE PAGE:
(CLASSIFICATION)
HEADQUARTERS (preparing report)

(DATE)
TYPE OF REPORT (e.g., CAPTURED MATERIEL TECHNICAL REPORT)
REPORT NUMBER: (e. g., 23) (Consecutive number for control by reporting unit)
REPORT NAME (Item(s) covered in report)
Date of Capture or Receipt: (if applicable)
Location of Reporting Unit: (e. g., Sorim Ni, Korea)
COPY NUMBER .@2_ of (8) COPIES (Prepare only
the minimum number required)
(CLASSIFICATION)

72

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
SIGNATURE PAGE:
(CLASSIFICATION)
1. CMTR (for example) Number: 23
2. Unit Name
3. Approval recommended by officer supervising
exploitation or work
4. Approved by OIC of reporting unit
5. Distribution
(CLASSIFICATION)
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Example 3. (CONFIDENTIAL) Captured Materiel
Technical Report (final-field)

(CLASSIFICATION)
HEADQUARTERS
305th CHEMICAL DETACHMENT
(TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE)
APO 725
1 November 1951

CAPTURED MATERIEL TECHNICAL
REPORT
NUMBER 23
AGGRESSOR IRRITANT SMOKE CANDLE
Captured 10 October 1951
LOCATION OF REPORTING UNIT
SORIM NI, KOREA
Copy Number 8 of 24 copies
(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 1 of 12 Pages
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CONFIDENTIAL
(CLASSIFICATION)

I. ABSTRACT
The captured aggressor irritant smoke candle is an
adamsite candle five inches high and five inches in
diameter, and is very similar in construction and
function to the now-obsolete United States irritant
gas candle M2. The aggressor candle is inferior
to our M2 in that it has a shorter burning time, is
poorly constructed and is dangerous to handle
because of sparks and flame emitted upon ignition.
Its advantages over the U. S. M2 include compactness, a more rapid gas emission, simplicity of construction and a greater smoke density output.
It is recommended that special precautions be
taken when handling the aggressor irritant smoke
candle.
(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 2 of 12 Pages
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(CLASSIFICATION)

II. INTRODUCTION
A. Four of the ten candles were forwarded through
normal channels to the zone of interior.
B. These irritant smoke candles are of new type
and are believed to be those mentioned in Information Request No. 1082, GHQ, FECOM. It is also
believed that these are the same type munitions
as those used against the 54th Brigade on 3 Oct
1951 at Thankyow.

III. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF ITEM
A. On 10 Oct 1951 Lt. Col. Shaw, the 28th Div
CmlO, notified the CO, 305th CD(TI), that the
28th Div had captured an aggressor depot, located
2;' miles north of Sorim Ni (coordinates 46024210
Map Korea 1:25,000). Upon investigation ten
enemy irritant smoke candles were found.
B. The aggressor irritant smoke candle is a cylindrical can 5 inches high and 5 inches in diameter
made up of two flanged sheet steel bonnets of equal
size bolted together with four bolts. The bonnets
are each 2½ inches high and 5 inches in diameter,
stamped from 20-gauge sheet steel. The bonnets
are separated by an asbestos gasket and a 30-gauge
steel disc, which divide the candle into two compartments of equal size. The lower compartment contains a match head-scratcher ignitor, a starter fuel
(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 3 of 12 Pages
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(CLASSIFICATION)

and a main cake of fuel. The upper compartment
contains a cake of adamsite (DM), a vent tube which
joins the two compartments, and a gas outlet port
shielded by a baffle plate. The exterior is painted
olive drab, has yellow bar insignia on the top and side,
and has an instruction label on the side. All interior metal to metal contacts are soldered except
where the baffle plate is riveted to the upper bonnet.
See figures 1 and 2.

IV. PHYSICAL AND/OR CHEMICAL CHARACTERISTICS
A. Physical characteristics.
1. Translation of labels and markings.
(a) Entire candle: Olive drab (except for
markings and label)
(b) Top of candle: One yellow bar signifying
adamsite smoke.
(c) Side of candle: One yellow bar signifying
adamsite smoke.

,&
11 56

Inspector's stamp
5-13-50 Model No. and
date of manufacture

(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 4 of 12 Pages
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(CLASSIFICATION)
Instruction label:
IRRITANT SMOKE CANDLE
(ADAMSITE) To operate, take position
up-wind, remove tape from outlets and
pull wire, draw wire out quickly and
stand back. (If not ignited, return wire,
turn it slightly, and repeat.) CAUTION:
KEEP AT LEAST 10 FEET FROM
INFLAMMABLES DURING OPERATION.
Store in Cool Dry Place
(d) Bottom: The letter "V" is imprinted on
the bottom. (Meaning unknown, possibly the manufacturing plant's symbol.)
2. Weight.
Gross weight __________________ (7.81 lbs) 3350g.
Adamsite_ ____________________________ 1410. 7 g.
Powder (fuel) _________________________ 1290.3 g.
Match head and starter mix____________
48.6 g.
Metal components_____________________ 800.4 g.

(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 5 of 12 Pages
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(CLASSIFICATION)

B. Chemical Composition. (Analysis by Analytical Section, (72d Cml Lab.)
1. Match head: KC1O3 , SbS, Al and sand.
2. Starter mixture: Barium Nitrate ____ 44. 2%
Potassium Chlorate 3. 4%
Antimony Sulfate__ 2. 1 %
Aluminum ________ 46. 4%
Binder (resin type)_ 3. 9%
3. Fuel mixture: NH4NO3 , NH4Cl, Cellulose
nitrate, powdered limestone. (The 72d
Cml Lab was unable to analyze the fuel
mixture quantitatively.)
4. Top compartment: Adamsite cake with small
amount of resin binder.
(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 6 of 12 Pages
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(CLASSIFICATION)
V. FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
A. The candle is ignited by removing all tape from
the outlets and pulling the pull-wire scratcher. The
scratcher grates across the match head, causing it
to ignite and in turn ignite the starter mixture.
This ignites the top mixture and finally the fuel.
The hot gasses from the fuel travel through the vent
tube into the upper compartment and are vented
across the cake of adamsite by the baffle plate, thus
vaporizing the adamsite, which is emitted along with
the smoke. Adamsite in this vapor form is much
more efficient than in the usual droplet-suspension
form which is characteristic of other gas generators.
The adamsite vapor covers a greater area and penetrates gas mask canisters more easily. This candle
is dangerous to store and use around other inflammables because of the sparks and flame it throws
occasionally during ignition.

(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 7 of 12 Pages
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(CLASSIFICATION)
B. Six of the captured candles were tested in the
field. The results from each candle were fairly
uniform. All burning times were from two to three
minutes. With a 3-mile-per-hour wind the adamsite
vapor laden smoke stayed together well enough to
have a harassing effect up to 500 yards. Several
men wearing US model M9 gas masks walked into
the thickest parts of the smoke and remained there
for four minutes with no ill effects. The dirtyyellow smoke emitted impaired visibility for the
first 100 yards well enough to conceal a man. Two
of the candles started with difficulty and a third
candle showered sparks for six to eight feet upon
ignition.

(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 8 of 12 Pages
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(CLASSIFICATION)
VI. TACTICAL USE
These candles have been used by the aggressor,
so far as is known, on only one occasion. This was
in an action against the British 54th Brigade. In
this incident, many candles were placed up-wind
from bunkers and gun emplacements and ignited.
Several of these candles were actually thrown 40 to
50 yards after ignition without impairing their operation. The results obtained from this harassing
maneuver were fairly good from the aggressor viewpoint, due mainly to the surprise factor. The
brigade's :firepower coordination was disrupted temporarily, resulting in the loss of several positions.
Had masks been available the use of these. candles
would probably have been ineffective.

(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 9 of 12 Pages
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(CLASSIFICATION)

VII. COMPARISON WITH U. S. MATERIEL
This aggressor smoke candle is very similar to the
now-obsolete U.S. irritant gas candle M2. The two
are essentially the same in principal and components,
but the aggressor candle is one inch less in height and
two inches less in diameter. This compactness is
advantageous because of the ease of transportation
in the field and the adaptability to hand-throwing.
The aggressor candle is more crudely constructed
than the U.S. model M2 and emits a heavier (darkyellow) smoke. The aggressor candle is faster burning
(two to three minutes as compared to three to five
minutes), with the consequence that it emits flames
and sparks violently, thereby endangering personnel
and causing a fire hazard.

VIII. DEDUCTIONS AS TO ENEMY RESOURCES
It appears that the bonnets were machine stamped
and are quite likely produced in quantity. All other
component parts were also apparently mass produced. However, the ten candles mentioned here
and those used against the 54th Brigade are the only
ones that have been reported.

(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 10 of 12 Pages
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XI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. This aggressor candle has the desirable features
of compactness and emission of a dense smoke cloud.
These qualities could be incorporated in our equipment of this type.
B. The M9 or equivalent-type gas mask is effective against these candles.
C. Troops should be cautioned about the danger
of igniting these aggressor candles, due to their erratic
emission of flame and sparks upon ignition.

(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 11 of 12 Pages
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CMTR #23
305th CD (TI)

AGGRESSOR IRRITANT SMOKE CANDLE
Report prepared by:
John Doe, Major, Cml C
Bill Smith, SFC, Cml C
Approved
2 Inds:
/s/ John Doe
1. Sketch, Aggressor Irritant
JOHN DOE
Smoke Candle-Figure 1
Major, Cml C
2. Sketch, Aggressor Irritant
Commanding
Smoke Candle (Crosssection) Figure 2
DISTRIBUTION:
Copies
1-10 Cml Officer, GHQ, FEC
11 Cml Officer, EUSAK
12-14 G-2, EUSAK (Tech Intel Coord)
15 G-2, I Corps
16 Cml 0, I Corps
17 Cml 0, IX Corps
18 Cml 0, X Corps
19-20 167 MISD
21 25th CD(TI)
22 15th CD(TI)
23-24 File, 305th CD (TI)
(CLASSIFICATION)
Page 12 of 12 Pages
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Figure 1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Inclosure No. 1 to CMTR.
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YELLOW BAN D5

BODY (OLIVE DRAB)

Figure 2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Inclosure No. 2 to CMTR.
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APPENDIX III (UNCLASSIFIED)
COMBAT UNIT CBR REPORTS
Page

Form I-Format, Standard Shelling, Mortaring,
Bombing, and Toxic Report_____________
Example I-Standard Shelling, Mortaring, Bombing,
and Toxic Report___________________

Form 1. Format, Standard Shelling,
Bombing, and Toxic Report

88
89

Mortaring,

SHELREP, MORTREP, BOMREP, TOXREP
A. FROM (Unit, use current call sign or code name)
B. POSITION OF OBSERVER (map reference
preferred; location of a headquarters or important observation post)
C. GRID OF MAGNETIC
omit for aircraft
(state which)
BEARING/AZIMUTH IN (state which)
DEGREES OR MILS OF (state which)
FLASH OR SOUND OR
GROOVE OF SHELL
D. TIME FROM
E. TIME TO
F. AREA SHELLED, MOR- (map reference
TARED, BOMBED OR in clear)
CONTAMINATED
G. NUMBER AND NATURE OF GUNS, MORTARS, AIRCRAFT, OR OTHER METHODS
OF DELIVERY
88
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H. NATURE OF FIRE (REGISmaybe
TRATION,
BOMBARDomitted for
MENT, HARASSMENT, etc.)
aircraft
I. NUMBER AND TYPE OF SHELLS, BOMBS,
TOXIC AGENTS, etc.
omit for airJ. TIME OF FLASH TO BANG
craft.
K. DAMAGE
optional; may include both
effects and casualties in the
case of toxic attack.
Note.

This report is transmitted by whatever means is
available and in abbreviated form. See following
page for example.

Example 1. Standard Shelling, Mortaring, Bombing, and Toxic Report.

TOXREP
ALFA___ _______________ OSCAR PAPA 1
BRAVO _____ - - - - - __ - - - - - __ - 365478
CHARLIE __________________ GRID AZIMUTH FLASH
1438 MILS.
DELTA __________________ 1252
ECHO ______________________ 1257
FOXTROT_ ______________ 378543
GOLF ______________________ 2 UNKNOWN
HOTEL __ -----------------INDIA _____________________
JULIETT ___________________
KILO______________ ______

HARASSMENT
18 MUSTARD
3 SECONDS
NEGLIGIBLE

(Headings of the form which cannot be completed
or are not applicable are omitted.)
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lAG 385 (14 Feb 58)1

By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
General, United States Army,
Ohief of Staff.

Official:
HERBERT M. JONES,

Major General. United States Army,
The .4.djutant General.

Distribution:
Active Army:

DCSPER (5)
Br Svc Sch (5) except
ACS! (15)
USACMLCSCH (100)
DCSOPS (5)
Gen Depots (2)
DCSLOG (5)
Sup Sec, Gen Depots (2)
ACSRC (5)
Depots (2)
Technical Stf, DA (5)
Ports of Emb (OS) (5)
USCONARC (40)
Trans Terminal Comd (5)
US ARADCOM (5)
Army Terminals (5)
US ARADCOM Rgn (5)
OS Sup Agcy (3)
OS Maj Comd (10) except
PG (2)
USAREUR (25),
Arsenals (2)
USARJ /UNO/ EA (R) (25)
Mil Dist (2)
OS Base Comd (3)
USA Corps (Res) (2)
Log Comd (3)
MDW (3)
Sectors, USA Corps (Res) (2)
Armies (5)
USAINTO (50)
Corps (5)
MAAG (1)
Div (5)
Mil Mis (1)
Brig (2)
ARMA (1)
Regt/Gpfbg (4)
Units organized under following
Ft &: Camps (2)
TOE's:
USMA (50)
3-500 (IA, IB) (2)
Svc Colleges (5) except USA CGSC
(50)
30-000 (AA, AE, MI) (2)
NG: State AG (2).
USAR: TOE: 3-500 (IA, IB) (5).
For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.
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U.
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GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 19U

WARNING NOTICES
Authority for release of this document to a foreign
government must be secured from the Assistant Chief
of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army.

When this document is released to a foreign
government, it is released subject to the following
conditions: This information is furnished with the
understanding that it will not be released l'o another
nation without speci fi c approva l of the _United States
of America, Department of the A rmyi that it will
not be used for other tha n military purposes; that
individual or corporation rights originating in the
information whether patented or not will be respected;
and that the informa tion will be afforded substantially
the same degree of security as affordel by the United
States of America, Department of the Army.

This document contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States within the
meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 1 8 U. S. C.,
sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an una uthorized
person is prohibited by law.

z

--t

ITI

rr-

Ci)

rn
n

z

ITI

~

C:

I

co
c.n
co

